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Abstract 
Reasoning that is deliberative and reflective often requires the inhibition of intuitive responses. 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is designed to assess people’s ability to suppress incorrect 
heuristic responses in favor of deliberation. Correct responding on the CRT predicts performance 
on a range of tasks in which intuitive processes lead to incorrect responses, suggesting indirectly 
that CRT performance is related to cognitive control. Yet little is known about the cognitive 
processes underlying performance on the CRT. In the current research, we employed a novel 
mouse tracking methodology to capture the time-course of reasoning on the CRT. Analysis of   
mouse cursor trajectories revealed that participants were initially drawn towards the incorrect 
(i.e., intuitive) option even when the correct (deliberative) option was ultimately chosen. 
Conversely, participants were not attracted to the correct option when they ultimately chose the 
incorrect intuitive one. We conclude that intuitive processes are activated automatically on the 
CRT and must be inhibited in order to respond correctly. When participants responded 
intuitively, there was no evidence that deliberative reasoning had become engaged. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Cognitive Reflection Test; Dual Processes; Reasoning; Conflict; Mouse tracking; 
Heuristic.  
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The Time Course of Conflict on the Cognitive Reflection Test 
1. Introduction 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is a brief test designed to measure 
individuals’ ability to inhibit intuitive responses in favor of reflective and deliberative reasoning. 
In the bat-and-ball problem, one of the best-known CRT items, participants are asked: 
“A bat and a ball together cost £1.10. 
A bat costs £1 more than a ball. 
How much does a ball cost?”  
The appealing but incorrect response, to say “10p”, is believed to be generated effortlessly and 
automatically by intuitive processes. Arriving at the correct response of “5p” may require that 
this intuitive response is inhibited in favor of the result of sustained, effortful deliberation. 
The CRT has become a popular measure of individual differences, for example it has 
been cited 11 times in Cognition since 2012, including 6 experiments using the test. Higher CRT 
scores predict better performance on various cognitive tasks, including reduced framing effects, 
less discounting of delayed rewards (Frederick, 2005; Cokely & Kelley, 2009) and probability 
matching (Koehler & James, 2010), resistance to the illusion of explanatory depth (Fernbach, 
Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013) and conjunction fallacies (Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009), 
greater metacognitive awareness (Mata, Fiedler, Ferreira, & Almeida, 2013) and less 
endorsement of supernatural belief (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; 
Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012), as well as performance on various tasks that pit normative 
responding against intuition (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). Scores on the CRT correlate 
with measures of IQ and personality characteristics, and usually predict performance on other 
tasks even when these are controlled for (Toplak et al., 2011). 
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The CRT is viewed by some as a prototypical application of dual process theories of 
cognition (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2011). Dual process theories (Evans, 
2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014) 
broadly distinguish Type 1 processes that quickly and effortlessly generate intuitive responses, 
and Type 2 processes that are under deliberative control and are demanding on working memory 
resources. Consistent with this, a number of studies (Böckenholt, 2010; Campitelli & Gerrans, 
2014; Campitelli & Labollita, 2010) have shown that performance on the CRT is predicted by a 
combination of dispositional factors, inhibitory control, and numerical ability.  
Dual process theories differ in their account of CRT performance. Intuition is the default 
mode of processing in default-interventionist models (Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2005), which hold that Type 2 processes must be engaged for reflective and deliberative 
processing to inhibit and override intuitive responses. Failure to engage Type 2 processes has 
been linked to individual differences in personality and intelligence (Stanovich and West, 2008) 
and task characteristics (Rolison, Evans, Walsh, & Dennis, 2011). When Type 2 processes are 
engaged, they may nevertheless fail to adequately replace an intuitive response (Stanovich and 
West, 2008). Failure to engage Type 2 processes has been proposed to explain incorrect heuristic 
responses on the CRT. Default-interventionist models make an important prediction about 
cognitive conflict during reasoning on the CRT. When a heuristic response is given, deliberative 
Type 2 processing likely has failed to become properly engaged. However, when the correct 
response is given, the incorrect, Type 1, heuristic response must have been inhibited by Type 2 
processing. 
In contrast to default-interventionist accounts, parallel-competitive dual process theories 
(Sloman 1996; 2014) hold that both Type 1 and Type 2 processes are activated simultaneously, 
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and that they compete for control of behavior. In common with default-interventionist models, 
these accounts predict that Type 1 intuitive responses must be inhibited in order to reason 
correctly. Uniquely though, parallel models would also predict Type 2 processes should attempt 
to signal the correct response, even when failing to overrule the output of Type 1 processes. 
More recently, De Neys (2012, 2014) has proposed an intuitive logic model. This 
modifies the traditional default-interventionist model to account for many findings which 
indicate that when participants provide biased, heuristic responses, they are often implicitly 
aware of some conflict between their responses and the normative standard. According to this 
model, Type 1 processes are sensitive to normative principles, such as logical principles in 
syllogistic reasoning tasks, or mathematical rules on the bat-and-ball problem. As a result, they 
implicitly signal a conflict when the incorrect heuristic response is given. However, because the 
heuristic response is usually prepotent, participants often fail to inhibit it, even when they do 
detect that it conflicts with normative principles. It is unclear at present, however, how this 
conflict is actually detected. One possibility is that Type 1 processes simultaneously produce 
both heuristic and correct responses, and it is the conflict between these two partially active 
responses which is detected directly. Alternatively, the process may be more subtle, with Type 1 
processes not generating a fully-formed correct response, but rather detecting, through some 
other means, that the heuristic response is questionable. Clearly, these two possibilities make 
different predictions about conflict between competing response options. In the former case, the 
intuitive logic model would, like a parallel-competitive account, predict that because both 
responses are partially cued, participants should be drawn towards giving the correct response 
during reasoning, even when they ultimately give the heuristic one. In the latter case, if Type 1 
processes can signal conflict without actually generating the correct response, participants may 
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experience conflict and uncertainty, but not be actually drawn towards the correct response when 
giving the heuristic one. 
Evidence of the implicit conflict detection predicted by the intuitive logic model comes 
from a range of experimental paradigms (see De Neys, 2012, for a review). Typically, these 
studies compare conflict problems, in which the intuitive, heuristic response is incorrect, to no-
conflict versions, where both heuristics and normative principles cue the same response. Type 1 
processes cue both the heuristic response on conflict problems and the correct response on no-
conflict problems. If participants detect the conflict between normative principles and their 
heuristic responses, they should show greater evidence of conflict on these problems, compared 
to the no-conflict problems. Such conflict has been measured using confidence ratings (De Neys, 
Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011), response times (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), neuroimaging (De 
Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008), and galvanic skin response (De Neys, Moyens, & 
Vansteenwegen, 2010), among other measures. 
Two studies have directly tested the intuitive logic model when applied to the CRT. De 
Neys, Rossi, & Houdé (2013) showed that heuristic responses on conflict problems were given 
with less confidence than correct responses on no-conflict problems. Gangemi, Bourgeois-
Gironde and Mancini (2014) report similar effects, asking participants to fill out a brief 
questionnaire measuring their “feeling of error” after answering either the original bat-and-ball 
problem or a no-conflict control version, both when participants were asked to generate their 
responses, and when asked to choose between the heuristic and correct responses. These findings 
all suggest that participants are to some extent aware of the inadequacy of their heuristic 
responses. 
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One difficulty in interpreting the above findings is differentiating between conflict and 
uncertainty. Conflict requires that participants are drawn towards two responses at the same time 
— the correct one, and the heuristic one. Uncertainty, on the other hand, does not require that 
participants are drawn to the correct response when they select the heuristic one, merely that they 
experience some sense of unease, indecision, or lack of confidence while doing so. It is difficult 
to say, without additional evidence, whether conflict, or uncertainty, underlie the results of 
earlier studies of intuitive logic on the CRT.  
In this study, we introduce a novel methodology which addresses this issue, and reveals 
the time-course of cognitive processing during reasoning on the CRT. Participants completed a 
computer-based multiple-choice version of the CRT while their mouse cursor movements were 
recorded. Mouse tracking has been used in other areas of psychology to reveal the time course of 
decisions on the basis of participants’ mouse cursor trajectories over a short period of time 
(Freeman, Dale, & Farmer, 2011; Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005). We employ it here to 
capture the cognitive processing underlying CRT performance over a longer timescale. If a 
classic default-interventionist account explains performance on the CRT, participants should 
exhibit an initial attraction to an incorrect heuristic option when a correct deliberative option is 
chosen, but not vice versa, when the heuristic option is chosen. If instead a parallel-competitive 
model explains performance on the task, then participants should also show attraction to the 
correct option when the intuitive option is chosen. The predictions of the intuitive logic model 
depend on the nature of the conflict detection process. If participants detect conflict because both 
responses are simultaneously generated by Type 1 processes, then the intuitive logic model, like 
the parallel-competitive model, would predict conflict in both directions. Alternatively, if the 
conflict detection process is more subtle, relying on a feeling of uncertainty, then like the classic 
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default-interventionist account it might predict that participants should be drawn to the heuristic 
option when selecting the correct one, but not the other way around. 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
One hundred and thirty one students at Queen’s University Belfast participated in 
exchange for course credit. 
2.2 Materials 
Eight problems were adapted from Primi, Morsanyi, Donati, Chiesi, and Hamilton’s 
(2015) extended version of the CRT. Each of these problems was modified to create a set of 
eight corresponding no-conflict problems, in which the intuitively appealing responses were also 
the correct ones (see the Appendix). Participants were randomly allocated to complete either 
conflict versions of problems 1, 3, 5, and 7 and no-conflict versions of the rest, or vice versa. 
Each problem was presented in a 4-option multiple choice format1. For the conflict items, the 
possible responses were the correct option, the incorrect heuristic option, and two incorrect foil 
 
1  Although it is unusual to present the CRT as a multiple-choice test, multiple-choice 
versions have been used previously by Morsanyi, Busdraghi and Primi (2014), Primi et al. (2015; 
Experiment 3), and Gangemi et al. (2013; Experiment 2), without any clear effect on 
participants’ responses. 
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options. For the no-conflict problems the correct intuitive option was presented with three 
incorrect foils. 
2.3 Procedure 
The experiment was administered on personal computers using custom programmed 
software. Participants were instructed to respond in their own time to each CRT problem by 
clicking on one of the four response options presented in the four corners of the display (Figure 
1). Participants were not made aware of the mouse tracking aspect of the experiment in advance.  
 
Figure 1: An example display from the CRT. 
 
Each item was preceded by onscreen instructions to click on a button marked “Go”, 
presented in the center of the monitor. This was done to ensure the mouse cursor was located in 
the same central position at the beginning of each trial. The button was then replaced by the 
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problem text and the four response options appeared simultaneously in the corners (Figure 1). 
The response options were randomly assigned to the four locations on each trial, with the 
constraint that the correct and heuristic response options were always adjacent for conflict 
problems. The mouse cursor was no longer visible at the onset of each trial to prevent it from 
obscuring the question text. The cursor reappeared once it had been moved more than 5% of the 
width of the display. Mouse cursor location was recorded every 25 msec. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 By-trial analysis 
After excluding data from 3 participants who did not complete the experiment within the 
15 minutes allocated, and 7 trials with response times greater than 100 seconds (.6% of the total), 
participants selected the correct option on 80% of no-conflict problems. On the conflict 
problems, the correct option was chosen 36% of the time, the heuristic option 58%, and one of 
the foils 6% of the time. A breakdown of responses for each individual problem is shown in the 
appendix.2 
 
2 Primi et al's (in press) extended version of the CRT was designed to capture more 
variance than the original three-item version.  Problems 5 and 6 are therefore considerably less 
difficult than the other problems, and as a result performance on the conflict versions of these 
problems was similar to that on the no-conflict versions. Therefore, we replicated each analysis 
reported below on a subset of the data excluding these problems. All reported significant effects 
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In the first stage of our analysis, we calculate a number of summary statistics for each 
trial, and compare these between problem types, and between responses. The measures were 
response time, the distance travelled by the mouse cursor (scaled so that a straight line from the 
start point to the response corresponds to 1 unit), the number of times the cursor was moved 
during a trial (with movements defined as windows of 100 msec or more in motion, separated by 
100 msec or more not moving), and the closest proximity achieved between the cursor and the 
non-chosen option (closest proximity to the heuristic response option on trials where the correct 
option was chosen, and vice versa). These measures were compared using linear mixed models, 
with crossed random intercepts for each participant, and each problem (see Baayen, Davidson, & 
Bates, 2008). Response latencies, and the distance travelled by the mouse cursor were log-
transformed to normalize their distributions, and a generalized mixed model with a Poisson log 
link was used to model the number of movements. To calculate p values for linear models, 
degrees of freedom for each parameter were calculated using Satterthwaite’s approximation 
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff & Christensen, 2015; Satterthwaite, 1946). 
Consistent with a dual process interpretation, for conflict problems there was greater 
evidence of conflict across all measures when participants gave the correct response (N = 181) 
than the heuristic one (N = 297). The average time to respond was 27.3 seconds (SD = 16.3) for 
correct responses, and 21.0 seconds (SD = 13.4; 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽 = 1.14, t(470.8) = 2.349, p = .0192) for 
heuristic responses. The mouse cursor travelled a greater distance before selecting a correct 
 
were unchanged, or increased in size, and all reported null effects remained, when these 
problems were excluded. 
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option (6.11 times the minimum needed distance, SD = 5.6) than a heuristic option (5.66 times, 
SD = 4.74; 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽 = 1.16, t(298.4) = 2.267, p = .0241). There were also more cursor movements on 
trials in which the correct response was given (5.4, SD = 4.8) than when the heuristic response 
was given (4.9, SD = 4.5; 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽 = 1.15, z = 2.337, p = .0195). Finally, the minimum distance 
between the cursor and the heuristic option on trials in which the correct option was chosen was 
on average 49% of the display width (SD = 24%), significantly less than the minimum distance 
between the cursor and the correct option on trials in which the intuitive option was chosen 
(55.5%, SD = 18%,  𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽 = 0.92, t(72.1) = 4.119, p < .0001).  
Most tests of the intuitive logic model compare correct responses on no-conflict problems 
with heuristic responses on conflict problems, on the basis that heuristic, Type 1 processes 
should cue both kinds of response, but the chosen response conflicts with normative principles 
on conflict problems only. Evidence for the intuitive logic model therefore comes from results 
which indicate greater conflict for heuristic responses to conflict problems. However, when we 
calculated each of the applicable measures for correct responses to no-conflict problems (N = 
404) we found no evidence of difference between the two types of response: response time (23.1 
seconds; t(14.3) = 0.222, p > .8), distance travelled (5.6, SD = 5.0; t(15.0) = 0.359, p > .7) and 
number of movements per trial (5.2, SD = 4.6; z = 0.064, p > .95). 
We also wished to explore any differences in these effects between the various problems. 
Therefore, we fit an additional mixed model comparing response times for conflict and no-
conflict versions of each problem.  We included crossed random intercepts for each participant 
and each problem, and, crucially, we allowed the effect of condition to vary between problems. 
The full results of this model can be found in the Supplementary Materials. Consistent with the 
analysis above, there was no significant difference between the conflict and no conflict 
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problems; t(7.4) = .551, p > .5. However, there was some variation between the problems, with 
the model showing a marginal effect in the direction predicted by the intuitive logic theory for 
the bat-and-ball problem, a robust effect in the opposite direction for the lily pad problem, and no 
significant effects for the remaining problems. 
Following previous intuitive logic studies (e.g. Mevel et al., 2014; Pennycook, Fugelsang 
& Koehler, 2015), we also calculated the number of heuristic responses given by each participant 
on conflict problems, and categorized each of the 128 participants who made at least one 
heuristic response as either “majority heuristic” (3 or 4 heuristic responses out of four, 53 
participants) or “minority heuristic” (1 or 2 heuristic responses, 75 participants). We entered this 
measure as a participant-level predictor in our models, but found that it was not involved with 
any interactions in the analyses above (t’s < 1, p’s > .4). We also repeated this analysis, 
comparing participants who made the most (four heuristic responses) and fewest (one heuristic 
response) heuristic responses, and again found no significant interactions (t’s < 1.1, p’s > .25). 
Therefore, these analyses revealed no evidence for the existence of conflicting responses 
regardless of how many heuristic responses participants gave. 
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3.2 Time course Analyses 
 
Figure 2: A typical mouse cursor trajectory from the conflict condition. Numerical values 
indicate the time elapsed in seconds. Cursors meandered as participants generated their 
responses, passing near the response options located in the corners of the display. 
 
In previous mouse tracking research (e.g. Freeman et al., 2011; Spivey et al., 2005), 
recording movements over a few seconds, the cursor typically moves straight to a response 
option, curves between two of them, or in some cases moves to one, and then the other. In our 
data, unfolding over up to 60 seconds, participants move and rest the cursor many times 
throughout a trial (an average of 5.1 times, and a maximum of 30), in a manner more similar to 
that of eye movements. A typical mouse cursor trajectory, shown in Figure 2, comprises a 
number of movements which pass near to several response options. In order to analyze 
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participants’ attraction to each response option over time, the display was divided into quadrants 
corresponding to the correct option, the intuitive option, and the two foil options. For the first 60 
seconds of each trial, the mouse cursor positions at each 200 millisecond time slice were coded 
according to which section of the screen they occupied, similar to fixation analyses of eye-
tracking data. For all the time course plots that follow, additional figures are included in the 
Supplementary Materials showing these data plotted separately for each problem, and for 
“majority/minority heuristic” participants. However, the results appear to be broadly consistent 
across problems and participants. 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of mouse cursors in the region of the screen corresponding to each 
response options, over time, for conflict and no-conflict problems. 
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Figure 3 shows, for each response region, the proportion of trials in which the cursor is in 
that region, for both conflict and no-conflict problems. While the proportions at 60 seconds 
largely reflects participants’ ultimate responses, earlier proportions show how these preferences 
developed over time. Both correct responses to no-conflict problems and heuristic responses to 
conflict problems were intuitively appealing, and participants began to move towards both 
options from after 5 seconds. After approximately 10 seconds, participants also began to move 
towards the correct response option on conflict problems, and the accumulation of cursors in the 
region of the heuristic option under conflict slowed accordingly. The proportion of cursors in the 
region of foil response options declined steadily in both conditions. Note that the proportions for 
the foil response options are averaged across the two foil options on conflict problems, and three 
options on no-conflict problems. 
The time course data also allow us to supplement the response time analyses reported 
above by looking at the speed at which participants moved the mouse cursor to the region of the 
response option they eventually did select. Figure 4 shows this measure for correct responses to 
no-conflict problems, and for both heuristic and correct responses to conflict problems. The 
curve for each response region over time was modelled using third-order polynomial logistic 
regression models (or growth curves; see Mirman, 2014), such that the log odds of the cursor 
being in that region were given as 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒3. Natural polynomials 
were used, meaning that the intercept corresponded to the log odds at 0 seconds, the linear term 
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to the simple change over time, and the quadratic and cubic terms to higher-order differences 
later in the time course.3  
 
Figure 4: Proportion of mouse cursors in the region of the response option which was ultimately 
selected on that trial. 
 
To test for a significant difference between two curves, a null model, in which the 
weights were the same for each curve, was compared with a full model, in which there were 
 
3  One disadvantage of using these natural polynomial terms is that they are by definition 
correlated, and so our model suffers from mild multicollinearity, which leads to some loss of 
statistical power. However, as the alternative, orthogonal polynomial terms would be difficult to 
interpret individually, we believe this approach lends itself to a clearer description of our data. 
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different 𝛽𝛽 weights for each curve. Chi-squared tests were used to compare the deviance of each 
model, with degrees of freedom corresponding to the number of 𝛽𝛽 weights added in the full 
model. Note that 𝛼𝛼, the intercept, was kept constant throughout. Finally, a random effect for the 
linear time term was included for each participant, to allow for individual variability in how 
quickly each participant moved towards a response in general. Random effects on other terms, by 
participant, or by problem, were considered, but led to convergence issues, and so only this term, 
which was found to account for the most variance, was included.  
Mirroring the response time analyses, and as predicted by all dual process accounts, on 
conflict problems participants were faster to move towards the heuristic response option when 
selecting it than to the correct option when selecting it (𝜒𝜒2= 4515.7, DF = 3, p < .0001), with the 
curves differing significantly on the linear, quadratic, and cubic terms (z’s > 5, p’s < .0001). 
Again consistent with the response time analyses, and contrary to previous findings supportive of 
the intuitive logic model, participants were faster to move towards the heuristic response on 
conflict problems then to move towards the correct response on no-conflict problems (𝜒𝜒2, DF = 
3, p < .0001), with this effect mainly driven by a significant difference on the linear term 
between the curves (z = 2.352, p = .0187).  
In order to test for attraction towards the heuristic option on conflict trials in which the 
correct option was chosen, we compared the probability over time of the cursor being in the 
region of the heuristic option with the average probability of it being in the region of either foil 
option on those trials (Figure 5). A higher probability of being in the region of the heuristic 
option than the foils constitutes evidence of an attraction towards that heuristic response, and 
visual inspection of Figure 5 shows that this is the case from approximately 10 seconds onwards. 
Again, third order polynomial regression models were fit to this data, which showed that the 
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difference between the curves was statistically significant (𝜒𝜒2= 428.2, DF = 3, p < .0001), with 
significant differences on the linear, quadratic, and cubic terms (z’s > 2.1, p’s < .05). Therefore, 
when selecting the correct response, participants were slower to move away from the heuristic 
option than to move away from the foils, as predicted both by default-interventionist and 
parallel-competitive accounts. 
Figure 5: Proportion of trials in the region of each option, over time, for conflict problems where 
the correct option was eventually chosen. Error bars show standard error of measurement. Lines 
show fitted polynomial regression curves. Participants were more likely to be in the region of the 
heuristic response from around 10 seconds onwards. 
 
A more interesting comparison is between the attraction towards the correct response 
option, and that towards the foil option, on conflict trials where the heuristic response is given. 
According to the default-interventionist account, Type 2 processes have not become engaged at 
this point, and so the correct response option should not be any more attractive than the foil 
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options. According to the parallel-competitive account, on the other hand, both Type 1 and Type 
2 processes should be engaged on such trials, and so participants should be drawn towards giving 
the response cued by Type 2 processes (that is, the correct response). Either result could be 
consistent with the intuitive logic theory, depending on the mechanism by which conflict is 
actually detected. If conflict detection occurs because Type 1 processes simultaneously cue both 
the correct and heuristic responses, then attraction towards the correct response option should be 
seen here. Conversely, if conflict is detected without Type 1 processes actually producing the 
correct response, then the intuitive logic theory, like the classic default-interventionist account, 
would predict no attraction towards the correct response option here. 
Figure 6: Proportion of trials in the region of each option, over time, for conflict problems where 
the heuristic option was eventually chosen. Participants were less or equally likely to be in the 
region of the correct option than a foil throughout. 
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Figure 6 shows that, contrary to the prediction of the parallel-competitive model, 
participants are not more likely to move towards the correct response option than either of the 
foils before selecting the heuristic option. Participants were in fact less likely to be in the region 
of the correct option than the foils. The polynomial regression model showed that the difference 
between the curves shown was again significant (𝜒𝜒2 = 208.0, DF= 3, p < .0001), with significant 
differences between the curves on the linear, quadratic, and cubic terms (z’s > 9, p’s < .0001). 
This result indicates that the correct responses were on average actually less attractive than the 
foils. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that part of the difficulty of the CRT lies in the failure 
of intuition to support the correct response. 
 
4. Discussion 
Our results are broadly consistent with a default-interventionist dual process theory 
(Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). For problems with an incorrect but intuitively 
appealing heuristic response, this response was given more quickly, and with less evidence of 
conflict, than the correct response. Participants’ mouse cursors began to move systematically to 
the region of the heuristic response option within approximately 5 seconds, compared to 10 
seconds for movements to the correct response option, and this trend was evident both when 
analysing all trials, and trials in which the response in question was given.  
When participants did give the correct response on conflict problems, they spent more 
time in the region of the heuristic response option than either of the foil options before doing so – 
a finding consistent with both default-interventionist and parallel-competitive accounts, 
suggesting that these participants considered the heuristic response before they reached the 
correct one. This finding is also consistent with modelling work (Böckenholt, 2012; Campitelli 
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& Gerrans, 2013) and individual differences studies (Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 
2011) which have shown that inhibition of the heuristic response is an important predictor of 
accuracy on the CRT. However, contrary to the prediction made from a parallel-competitive dual 
process theory (Sloman 1996; 2014), on trials where the heuristic response was given 
participants’ were no more likely to place the cursor in the region of the correct response option 
than either foil option. 
These results also have implications for the logical intuitions theory (De Neys, 2012; 
2014). In support of this theory, a number of previous studies using simpler reasoning tasks have 
found that heuristic responses to conflict problems take longer than correct responses to no-
conflict problems, despite both being cued by Type 1 processes (e.g. De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; 
Stupple & Ball, 2008).  To our knowledge, the current study is the first to report response times 
for conflict and no-conflict versions of the CRT, and although analysis of response times was not 
the main focus of the current experiment, we did not find the effect that has been obtained on 
simpler tasks. In fact, when analysing participants’ speed of movement to the response option 
they ultimately selected, a more sensitive measure, we found the opposite effect: participants 
who chose the heuristic option under conflict moved faster to their chosen option than did 
participants who chose the correct option in the absence of conflict. These findings held 
regardless of individual differences in the tendency to give the heuristic response. Thus, unlike a 
number of studies using simpler reasoning problems, we found no evidence that participants 
were slower to give intuitively-cued responses which were wrong than intuitively-cued responses 
which were right. Furthermore, as discussed above, we found no evidence of an attraction 
towards the correct response option on conflict problems where the heuristic response was given.  
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Previous intuitive logic studies of the CRT (De Neys et al.,2013; Gangemi et al., 2014) 
notwithstanding, much evidence for the theory has come from experiments with simpler tasks, 
such as simple syllogistic reasoning (Morsanyi & Handley, 2012), or the forced-choice base rate 
neglect paradigm (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). It is possible that there are boundary conditions 
on the effects that have been found in these earlier experiments, and indeed this possibility has 
been noted by De Neys (2012; 2014). For instance, it has been demonstrated that participants 
report “liking” syllogisms which are logically valid more than those which are invalid, even 
when not asked to evaluate their logical status (Morsanyi & Handley, 2012), but also that this 
effect only holds for simpler logical forms (Klauer & Singmann, 2013).  The operations required 
to reach the correct answer to our CRT problems are considerably more complex than those 
needed to evaluate a simple syllogism, or apply basic statistical principles. Therefore, while we 
do not find evidence that Type 1 processes automatically generate correct responses on the CRT, 
this does not rule out that they can generate correct responses on simpler tasks. Future work 
might use the mouse tracking paradigm to explore the role of implicit conflict detection in some 
of these simpler tasks. 
To maximize statistical power, we analyzed performance on an extended eight-item 
version of the CRT. However, the two previous studies of intuitive logic in the CRT (De Neys et 
al., 2013; Gangemi et al., 2014), which found reduced confidence for conflict versus no-conflict 
problems, used only the well-known bat-and-ball problem. While our results were broadly 
consistent across problems, we did find some evidence that the bat-and-ball problem follows the 
predictions of the intuitive logic model more than the other seven problems (see the 
Supplementary Materials). Therefore, this discrepancy may go some way towards explaining the 
differences between our results and previous work, although it remains to be seen why the bat-
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and-ball problem should behave differently to the other CRT problems.  However, our main 
finding – that participants were not drawn towards the correct option when giving the heuristic 
response – was consistent across all items.  
A possible criticism of our interpretation here is that a failure to confirm the predictions 
of a parallel-competitive model, or of one version of the intuitive logic account, should not lead 
us to revise our beliefs about either account. It may be the case, according to this line of 
reasoning, that participants are drawn towards the correct option on trials where they give the 
heuristic response, or that participants are more conflicted when their heuristic responses are 
wrong than when they are right, but we are unable to detect these mental states using our 
paradigm. However, it is certainly not the case that our paradigm is totally insensitive. It did 
reveal, for instance, that participants were initially drawn towards the heuristic option before 
giving the correct response on conflict problems, consistent with multiple dual process accounts.  
That said, it may still be the case that the attraction effects predicted by parallel-competitive and 
intuitive logic accounts differ in some way from the observed attraction towards the intuitively 
appealing response. It is not clear at this point, however, why this should be. One possibility, 
raised by a reviewer, is that participants who select the correct response engage in more Type 2 
processing that those selecting the heuristic response, and that this could lead to a closer 
correspondence between their mental states and their mouse movements. Clearly, further work is 
needed to address these questions.  Interestingly, the actual effect found was in the opposite 
direction to that predicted by these accounts. However, this result was unexpected, and to our 
knowledge is not predicted by any existing account of the task. 
Of course, all of the above assumes a dual process interpretation of the CRT, as most 
treatments of the task do. Even in accounts which focus instead on dispositional factors (i.e. 
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Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Campitelli & Labollita, 2010), it is acknowledged that responding 
correctly typically requires the inhibition of the heuristic response. While we are unaware of any 
accounts of the CRT which do not rely on inhibition, we cannot rule out the possibility of such 
explanations being offered in future. The current paper, however, provides an additional 
constraint on such accounts, in that they should ideally predict not only observed choices, but 
also the process level patterns reported here. More generally, we believe the current study 
illustrates the value of testing theories of cognition not only against participants’ final choices, 
but also against what we can measure of processing during the experimental task (see De Neys, 
2009; Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kuehberger, & Ranyard, 2010).  
The particular application of the mouse tracking paradigm used here is a novel one, and 
like all experimental paradigms it rests on certain assumptions: in this case, that the movement of 
the mouse cursor reflects the real-time development of preference, or, in other words, that 
participants are more likely to move the cursor towards an option if they are considering 
selecting it. However, while this temporally-extended form of mouse tracking is new to 
psychology, researchers interested in practical human-computer interaction problems make 
extensive use of a similar paradigm, recording mouse movements as users interact with a 
graphical interface, such as a search engine results pages (see Huang, White, & Dumais, 2011). 
Combining this approach with eye tracking, Rodden, Fu, Aula, & Spiro (2008) report that while 
mouse movements correlate with gaze, they also are used in more task-specific ways, such as 
hovering near potential selections as a marker while eye gaze is used to explore other less likely 
candidates. We believe, therefore, that our data do reflect the development of participants’ 
preferences across time.  
Running head: CONFLICT ON THE COGNITIVE REFLECTION TASK 
 
26 
 
Since its introduction in 2005, the CRT has been hugely popular as a measure of 
individual differences in thinking, despite only little evidence as to what underlies performance 
on the task. Our results go some way towards filling this gap, and suggest that responding 
correctly does require the activation of otherwise dormant type 2 processes to override incorrect 
intuitions. Future work might address the relationship between conflict on this task and 
individual differences. Stanovich and West (2008) proposed that normative decision making 
requires (1) awareness of the limitations of intuition; (2) desire to overcome those limitations; (3) 
inhibition of the intuitive response; and (4) ability to generate the correct response. Each of these 
requirements is a distinct reason for failure to produce the correct response on the CRT, and each 
should produce a distinctive pattern in mouse cursor movement data. 
To conclude, we recorded participants’ mouse cursor movements over a considerable 
period of time while they reasoned about CRT problems. Trends in these movements were 
consistent with a default-interventionist dual process theory of reasoning, where participants are 
initially drawn towards heuristic responses only, but in some cases engage further effortful 
processing to find the correct solutions. We did not find evidence that participants were drawn to 
correct responses on trials where these responses were not actually given, inconsistent with a 
parallel-competitive dual process account. Finally, contrary to previous work using simpler 
reasoning tasks, and confidence ratings collected on the CRT, we found no evidence that 
participants were conflicted when giving incorrect heuristic responses. 
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Appendix: Cognitive Reflection Test Questions 
 Conflict No-conflict 
1 A bat and a ball together cost £1.10. 
A bat costs £1 more than a ball. 
How much does a ball cost? 
A bat and a ball together cost £1.05. 
A bat costs £1. 
How much does a ball cost? 
Correct response: 
Heuristic response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
5p 
10p 
15p 
90p 
(15%) 
(83%) 
(0%) 
(2%) 
Correct response: 
Foil response:  
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
5p 
10p 
15p 
90p 
(97%) 
(0%) 
(1%) 
(1%) 
2 It takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5  
widgets. How many minutes would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? 
It takes a machine 5 minutes to make 5  
widgets. How many minutes would it take the 
machine to make 100 widgets? 
Correct response: 
Heuristic response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
5 
100 
50 
10 
(24%) 
(69%) 
(4%) 
(3%) 
Correct response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
100 
5 
50 
10 
(83%) 
(2%) 
(13%) 
(2%) 
3 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. 
Every day, the patch doubles in size. 
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover 
the entire lake, how many days would it take 
for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. 
Every day, the patch grows by 10m2. 
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover 
the 150m2, how many days would it take 
for the patch to cover 140m2? 
Correct response: 
Heuristic response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
47 
24 
12 
2 
(26%) 
(58%) 
(15%) 
(2%) 
Correct response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
47 
24 
12 
2 
(79%) 
(17%) 
(4%) 
(0%) 
4 If you flipped a fair coin twice, what is 
the probability that it would land 
'Heads' at least once? 
If you flipped a fair coin twice, what is 
the probability that it would land 
'Heads' exactly once? 
Correct response: 
Heuristic response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
75% 
50% 
25% 
100% 
(4%) 
(84%) 
(11%) 
(1%) 
Correct response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
(68%) 
(26%) 
(6%) 
(0%) 
5 If 3 elves can wrap 3 toys in 
1 hour, how many elves are needed 
to wrap 6 toys in 2 hours? 
If 3 elves can wrap 3 toys in 
1 hour, how many toys could 6 elves 
wrap in half an hour? 
Correct response: 
Heuristic response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
3 
6 
1 
12 
(73%) 
(21%) 
(2%) 
(4%) 
Correct response: 
Foil response:  
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
3 
6 
1 
12 
(71%) 
(20%) 
(1%) 
(8%) 
6 Ellen and Kim are running around a track. 
They run equally fast but Ellen started later. 
When Ellen has run 5 laps, Kim has run 10 laps. 
When Ellen has run 10 laps, how many has Kim run? 
 
Ellen and Kim are running around a track. 
They started at the same time, but Kim is twice as fast as Ellen. 
When Ellen has run 5 laps, Kim has run 10 laps. 
When Ellen has run 10 laps, how many has Kim run? 
 
Correct response: 
Heuristic response: 
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
15 
20 
5 
19 
 
(73%) 
(27%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
Correct response: 
Foil response:  
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
20 
15 
5 
19 
(98%) 
(2%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
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7 Jerry received both the 15th highest and 
the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many 
students are there in the class? 
Jerry received both the 2nd highest and 
the 2nd lowest mark in the class. How many 
students are there in the class? 
 
Correct response:  
Heuristic response:  
Foil response:  
Foil response:  
29 
30 
40 
5 
(26%) 
(72%) 
(2%) 
(0%) 
Correct response: 
Foil response:  
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
3 
2 
5 
10 
(79%) 
(13%) 
(8%) 
(0%) 
8 In an athletics team tall members tend to win 
three times as many medals than short members. 
This year the team has won 60 medals so far. 
How many of these have been won by short athletes? 
In an athletics team tall members tend to win 
twice as many medals than short members. 
This year the team has won 60 medals so far. 
How many of these have been won by short athletes? 
Correct response:  
Heuristic response:  
Foil response:  
Foil response:  
15 
20 
30 
50 
(44%) 
(52%) 
(1%) 
(3%) 
Correct response: 
Foil response:  
Foil response: 
Foil response: 
20 
15 
30 
50 
(58%) 
(12%) 
(26%) 
(4%) 
Note. Percentages in parentheses show the proportion of participants who gave each response. 
 
